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Abstract
We analyze the security of recently proposed image encryption scheme [1]. We show that the
scheme is insecure and the methods used to evaluate its security are insucient. By designing
the Deliberately Weak Cipher, a completely vulnerable cipher with good statistical properties, we
illustrate our main point – a solid analysis cannot be replaced by some selected set of statistical
properties.
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1 Introduction
Encryption is an important tool for ensuring condentiality of data. Recently, the ECCHC – a combi-
nation of elliptic-curve cryptography and Hill cipher – was proposed by Dawahdeh, Yaakob and bin
Othman [1]. The proposal is specically aimed at image encryption. The authors justify the security of
the ECCHC by evaluating selected statistical properties on sample plaintext and ciphertext images. The
properties are entropy, peak signal to noise ratio, and unied average changing intensity.
Our conribution. We analyze the security of the ECCHC scheme and show its various weaknesses
that render the scheme unusable for any security sensitive application. Evaluating some selected set of
statistical properties is not an adequate replacement for analyzing how cryptanalytic attacks apply to an
encryption scheme. In order to accentuate this point, we propose a toy example – the Deliberately Weak
Cipher (DWC). The DWC is completely weak (with only 8 bit key and other serious vulnerabilities), but
it attains comparable or even better statistical parameters (depending on input image type) than the
ECCHC.
2 The ECCHC scheme
The ECCHC scheme combines public key cryptography based on elliptic curves with symmetric en-
cryption in a straightforward way. The authors tailored their proposal to encryption of 8-bit grayscale
images of size 256 × 256 pixels, although it can be easily extended to other image types. To keep our
presentation simple, we also use this particular image type. The weaknesses identied in the scheme
are relevant for possible extension as well.
2.1 Overview of the scheme
The ECC part of the scheme is basically a Die-Hellman key agreement. Let (E, ·) be a group of points
on some elliptic curve, generated by a generatorG . Let |E | = p be a prime. A userU can generate his/her
private key nU by randomly choosing from {0, 1, . . . ,p − 1}. The corresponding public key is PU = nUG .
Two users, A and B, can agree on a shared point KI = (x ,y) ∈ E by computing KI = nAPB = nAnBG
(for user A) or KI = nBPA = nAnBG (for user B). The point KI is used to obtain a 2 × 2 matrix K :
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K =
[
k11 k12
k21 k22
]
,
where (k11,k12) = xG and (k21,k22) = yG. A 4 × 4 self-invertible matrix Km is formed as follows (I
denotes a 2 × 2 identity matrix):
Km =
[
K I − K
I + K −K
]
,
Since the matrix is used for encrypting plaintexts with the alphabet of size 256 (8-bit grayscale) the
elements are transformed mod 256.
The second part of the scheme is Hill cipher used in the ECB (Electronic Codebook) mode to
sequentially encrypt 4× 1 vectors from a plaintext image. We denote by P1, . . . , Pn the sequence of 4× 1
vectors that the image is split into (for 256 × 256 image we have n = 2562/4 = 16384). The ciphertext is
a sequence of blocks C1, . . . ,Cn , where the i-th block/vector Ci is computed by simple matrix-vector
multiplication: Ci = Km · Pi . Given that Km is self-invertible, a decryption uses the same multiplication:
Pi = Km ·Ci .
2.2 Weaknesses of the ECCHC scheme
We discuss some properties of the ECCHC that, in our opinion, make the scheme insecure and unsuitable
for any security sensitive application.
Low entropy of the symmetric key. The matrix Km is uniquely determined by any of its quadrants,
e.g. 4 elements of K mod 256 are sucient to reconstruct Km . Hence the worst case complexity of
brute-force attack is very low ∼ 24·8 = 232.
Known plaintext attack. The proposal inherits the linearity of Hill cipher. This makes it vulnerable
to known plaintext attack. For 4 × 1 plaintext block and corresponding ciphertext block we obtain four
linear equations with 4 unknowns (values of the matrix K). For random plaintext block we can nd a
unique solution with high probability. Multiple distinct plaintext-ciphertext pairs of blocks yield the key
with certainty.
Using the symmetric transformation in the ECB mode. Opting for the ECB mode has a well
known weakness: equal plaintext blocks are encrypted to equal ciphertext blocks, Pi = Pj ⇒ Ci = Cj .
This property can be particularly unfortunate for images containing patterns or drawings, where equal
4 × 1 blocks are expected. It is certainly possible to modify the symmetric part of the ECCHC to employ
a counter or using other modes, however the proposal does not address this issue in any way.
Fixed points. The structure of self-invertible matrix Km guarantees that vectors of the form P =
(p,p,p,p)T , for any p, are xed points regardless of actual values in Km :
Km · P =
[
K I − K
I + K −K
]
·

p
p
p
p
 =

K ·
[
p
p
]
+ (I − K) ·
[
p
p
]
(I + K) ·
[
p
p
]
− K ·
[
p
p
] =

p
p
p
p
 .
Let us illustrate the ECB mode and the xed points issues. A checkerboard image, see Figure 1, is
an example of plaintext image that remains intact after encrypting with any Km . Encrypted drawing
with uniform color areas might be comprehensible (only slightly distorted along edges). An example is
shown in Figure 2.
2
Figure 1: Checkerboard – invariant image for any symmetric key Km .
Figure 2: ECCHC – Plaintext and ciphertext of a drawing.
Inadequate security analysis. The security analysis included in the proposal contains evaluation of
these three statistical properties on few sample images:
• Entropy of the encrypted image considering frequencies of pixel values.
• Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) using original and encrypted images.
• Unied Average Changing Intensity (UACI) using original and encrypted images.
Such analysis neglects other cryptographic properties the symmetric cipher is expected to satisfy. More
importantly, it ignores all potential attacks (some weaknesses were discussed in previous paragraphs).
To further illustrate this point we propose an intentionally weak cipher (weaker than the symmetric
part of the ECCHC) and show that we can obtain comparable or even better values of above properties,
see Section 3.
Unclear public key part of the ECCHC. The elliptic curve key agreement part of the ECCHC is
under-specied. The proposal does not dene what kind of elliptic curves should be used, how large
the parameters should be (small entropy of symmetric key Km indicates that using standardized elliptic
curves is pointless), how exactly are xG and yG values transformed into matrix K (when to apply mod
256 operation), etc.
3 Deliberately weak cipher
We designed the Deliberately Weak Cipher (DWC for short) to illustrate the inadequacy of statistical
measures for assessing the strength of encryption algorithms. Suitable values of statistical properties are
necessary but by no means sucient condition for secure encryption. We start by reviewing properties
used in the ECCHC proposal.
3.1 Remarks on statistical properties
Entropy for 8-bit grayscale image X is calculated as Entropy(X ) = −∑255i=0 pi log2 pi , where pi denotes a
fraction of pixels with value i . The maximum entropy in this case is 8, and we expect that random noise
image has entropy close to 8.
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The Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) is used to measure quality between signal with a noise and
the original signal. In our case, let A = (ai, j )ni, j=1 and B = (bi, j )ni, j=1 be two 8-bit grayscale images. The
PSNR, expressed in decibels, is computed as follows:
PSNR(A,B) = 20 · log10
255√
MSE(A,B)
,
where MSE(A,B) = n−2 ·∑ni, j=1(ai, j − bi, j )2 is the Mean Square Error between these two images. It is
easy to calculate the expected value of the PSNR between all-black (or all-white) image and a random
noise image – the MSE is 21717.5, and the corresponding PSNR is ∼ 4.7627. Similarly, the expected
value of the PSNR between two random noise images is ∼ 7.7476.
The Unied Average Changing Intensity (UACI) measures the average distance among pixel values
using following formula:
UACI(A,B) = 1
n2
·
n∑
i, j=1
|ai, j − bi, j |
255 × 100%.
Trivially, the UACI of all-black (or all-white) image and a random noise image is 50%. Calculating the
expected value of the UACI for two random noise images yields 1/3 + 1/(3 · 255) ∼ 33.46%.
We are interested in two cases: (1) a pair of two random noise images, and (2) a pair of monochrome
black (white) image and a random noise image. The distinction between these cases is important in the
evaluation of encryption algorithms. Consider a cryptographically strong encryption algorithm and
pair of plaintext and ciphertext images. We expect that a statistical properties for this pair are close to
the rst case if the plaintext is a photograph, painting, etc.; and close to the second case if the plaintext
is a drawing, checkerboard, or simply an image with a vast majority of black/white pixels.
3.2 The DWC algorithm
The DWC encryption uses 8-bit key k , obviously too short for any serious application. To make it similar
to the ECCHC, a core transformation used in the DWC takes 4 × 1 input vector. Let P = (p0,p1,p2,p3)T
be an input vector of four bytes. The core transformation is dened as follows:
CT(P) = M  (S(p0), S(p1),p2, S(p3))T ,
where S is an 8-bit s-box and M  computes a xed matrix multiplication, borrowed from the AES
SubBytes and MixColumns transformations, respectively [3]. Please note that our matrix multiplication
operates on a single vector (column), instead of four columns transformation MixColumns in the AES.
The output of CT is again 4 × 1 vector. The core transformation can be easily inverted by multiplying
with inverse matrix and performing three lookups to the table representing S−1. Although we do not
care about the performance of the DWC, various enhancements in this area can be obtained from vast
literature on the implementation of the AES.
To mimic the ECCHC we split an image into a sequence of 4 × 1 vectors P1, . . . , Pn . The ciphertext
is a sequence of blocks C1, . . . ,Cn :
Ci = CT(Pi ⊕ i ⊕ ((k ⊕ lsb(i))  24)), for i = 1, . . . ,n,
where ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR operation, lsb returns the least signicant byte, and x  24 shifts
the byte x to the left for 24 position. Thus (k ⊕ lsb(i))  24) yields a 32-bit vector with the most
signicant byte being k ⊕ lsb(i) and other three bytes being 0. The decryption is straightforward:
Pi = CT−1(Ci ) ⊕ i ⊕ ((k ⊕ lsb(i))  24)), for i = 1, . . . ,n.
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3.3 Properties of the DWC algorithm
The DWC algorithm is very weak. The most important vulnerability is small key space (overall, only
256 keys), and thus being susceptible to brute-force attack. Another weaknesses follow from fact that
the core transformation CT is xed and does not depend on the key in any way. Therefore anyone can
compute CT−1 on ciphertext blocks and obtain Pi ⊕ i ⊕ ((k ⊕ lsb(i))  24)). Since i is known (it is just
a counter) one can easily compute Pi ⊕ (k  24)). This is the original plaintext block with the most
signicant byte XOR-ed with k . Hence anyone can recover 75% of the image without knowing the key.
Design of the DWC is aimed at obtaining good values of statistical properties, such as the entropy,
the PSNR and the UACI. We use four sample images – two standard photographs (lena, baboon),
checkerboard, and drawing (both used in Section 2.2 as well). Figure 3 shows a visual overview of
plaintext and corresponding ciphertext images. There are no fragments of original images, visible
patterns or obvious regularities in the ciphertext images.
Figure 3: DWC on sample images.
Table 1 compares the numerical values of the entropy, the PSNR and the UACI for the DWC and
the ECCHC for our sample images. The results for lena and baboon images are very close, and we can
consider the DWC and the ECCHC as equal in these types of images. Image types like checkerboard or
drawings pose a problem for the ECCHC (as already discussed in Section 2.2). On the other hand, the
DWC produces ciphertext images with much superior statistics – close to values we expect for those
image types, see Section 3.1.
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We can summarize – the DWC is very weak cipher that excels in the entropy, the PSNR, and the
UACI properties.
algorihtm image Entropy PSNR UACI [%]
ECCHC lena 7.9947 9.3709 28.1994
baboon 7.9965 9.4589 28.0132
checkerboard 1.0000 ∞ 0.0000
drawing 1.6929 16.2244 3.9406
DWC lena 7.9974 9.4180 28.1236
baboon 7.9971 9.5001 27.8896
checkerboard 7.9979 4.7623 50.0049
drawing 7.9979 4.9161 48.8540
Table 1: Comparison of ECCHC and DWC for sample images
Remarks. (1) The key length of the DWC could be even smaller. We can x k to some constant and get
an encoding scheme good statistical properties and no security at all.
(2) The DWC is by no means a unique construction. Various approaches can be used to fulll the
same goals. For example, many lightweight stream ciphers with severely reduced key length would be
similarly vulnerable, while still having good values of the entropy, the PSNR and the UACI for image
encryption.
4 Conclusion
We showed various weaknesses of the ECCHC image encryption scheme, despite good statistical
properties published in the proposal [1]. More importantly, we illustrated insuciency of such approach
to analyzing the strength of encryption algorithm by proposing the Deliberately Weak Cipher. The
DWC has comparable or even better statistical parameters (depending on input image type) than the
ECCHC, while being completely weak.
For any encryption scheme proposal, the real cryptanalytic assessment of the scheme should be
conducted. Evaluating some selected set of statistical properties is not an adequate replacement for
analyzing how cryptanalytic attacks apply to the scheme.
The ECCHC should not be used for image (and other data) encryption. Use standard encryption tech-
niques. In case of resource-constrained devices, the area of lightweight cryptography oers alternative
algorithms with better security. For recent survey on lightweight cryptography, see [2].
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